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Abstract 
 
European legal integration can be envisioned as containing two dimensions of legal 
integration: vertical and horizontal.  Vertical legal integration is a top down process where the 
establishment of a hierarchical legal order of courts and laws causes national courts to make 
more similar decisions over time as they increasingly come under the formal authority of a 
higher court.  The European legal integration literature speaks mainly to vertical, formal, legal 
integration where the ECJ and EU law have asserted themselves as a formal authority over the 
national courts of the member states and compel the integration of the national courts.  
Horizontal legal integration involves national courts making more similar decisions over time 
because the national courts interact, borrow, and imitate each other informally.  Vertical legal 
integration can compel national courts to take into account EU law and ECJ precedent, but it 
cannot control for variances in interpretation.  The focus of this paper is not just on how the 
power dynamics of courts and laws have changed in Europe, but also how the legal realm of 
Europe has shifted to a greater frequency of shared legal outcomes.  There have been hints in the 
European integration literature about horizontal legal integration in many vertical integration 
studies (See Jupille and Caporaso 2009; Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1995).  
This paper will pursue further the notion that there are distinct dynamics of horizontal and 
informal legal integration and that horizontal legal integration in conjunction with vertical legal 
integration can contribute to a more complete understanding of the process of European legal 
integration.  In this paper I argue that the historical progression of increasingly autonomous and 
powerful national courts (court empowerment) in Western Europe has allowed a process of 
transnational judicial dialogue to occur.  Transnational judicial dialogue is composed of 
horizontal, transnational interactions between national high courts judges, where judges across 
countries voluntarily draw upon each other‟s rulings, logics, and academic writings and 
incorporate them into their own logics and rulings.  I argue that this process of transnational 
judicial dialogue has furthered legal integration through the transmission of jurisprudence and 
legal concepts between different member state national judiciaries through informal, horizontal 
legal integration. 
 
Introduction 
 
My research examines the dynamics of European legal integration and the fusion of 
national and supranational legal realms into a multi-dimensional legal apparatus.  Specifically I 
hope to contribute to this general field through examination of the effects of European legal 
integration on domestic legal systems of the member states and an increased focus on how legal 
concepts/ideas are transmitted to and impact once in the domestic legal realm.  The focus of my 
research is not just on how the power dynamics of courts and laws have changed in Europe, but 
also how the legal realm of Europe has shifted to a greater frequency of shared legal outcomes 
and concepts.  The European legal integration literature explores the transformation of treaties 
among sovereign states within the European Union (EU) into a vertically integrated legal order 
conferring rights on individuals (Stone Sweet 2004).  The European legal realm has been 
transformed into stratified legal order where supranational institutions (the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)) assert themselves above 
national legal orders and domestic courts within the domain of the EU.  EU law is by no means a 
complete and all-encompassing legal system, much of EU law is still being written and the 
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process of legal integration is ongoing.  Through EU supranational institutions and the process of 
acquis communautaire a set of shared laws is created and transmitted to the member states and a 
formal process of adjudication (in the form of a court, ECJ) is established for disputes between 
member states, EU institutions, and/or private interests.  EU law originates in three spheres: 
produced by the international treaties that established the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) to the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), from the EU 
institutions (European Commission, European Parliament (EP), Council of Ministers, and the 
ECJ), and from the Council of Europe. 
However, there is also evidence that EU law is not the only form of “foreign law” being 
transmitted into the domestic legal systems of the member states.  The German legal concept of 
proportionality penetrated the British legal system in the early 1970‟s and has been fully 
incorporated at all levels of the British judiciary (Jupille and Caporaso 2009, pg 210-212) .  The 
root of the Italian concept of danno biologico “damage per se” originates from the British notion 
of “special damage” and began to emerge in the Italian jurisprudence after World War II as a 
means to deal with damage caused by soldiers during WWII and has recently been seen in 
German court cases in the late 1990‟s (Markesinis 2005, pg 2-5).  Since 1909, German courts 
have borrowed concepts and jurisprudence on issues relating to limited liability of companies 
from American, English, and Austrian jurisprudence (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006, 
pg 73).  These three examples illustrate the mobility of foreign law around Europe and across the 
Atlantic without an international or supranational institution compelling it; a process of legal 
homogenization prior to and independent of the EU.  These two forms of legal integration can be 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
The empirical literature often tends to convolute these two phenomena, in my research I 
will attempt to disentangle them and their causes.  How much of foreign law in the domestic 
legal realm is the result of transmission from the EU institutions down and how much is the 
result of domestic judicial actors seeking new answers to new or commonly shared problems?  
To what degree have EU legal institutions been successful at transmitting EU law to member 
states and how have member states judiciaries used EU law?  How does foreign law enter into 
the domestic legal realm and what are its impacts once there?  What causes convergence in 
interpretations and court case outcomes across national borders in Europe?  Is it a result of EU 
law and institutions, the voluntary spread of foreign law, or some combination of the two? 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework of my research rests on one primary assumption and four key 
concepts.  The primary assumption on which my work resides is the notion that judges do create 
law, policy, and influence the political landscape.  The four key concepts include: legal 
integration, shared outcomes, transnational judicial dialogue, and empowerment.  This section 
will break down the assumptions and key concepts and discuss how these ideas influence the 
reserach project. 
 
Primary Assumption 
 
 In my research, I assume that judges do create law, policy, and influence the political 
landscape and that judicial lawmaking occurs.  There is a wide body of empirical literature to 
support this idea originating in an American context and more recently being applied to 
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judiciaries in Europe (For British examples see Reid 1972; Cappelletti, Kollmer, and Olson 
1989; Mason 1996; Zimmermann 1997; O'Scannlain 2004).  This is also an implicit assumption 
in most European legal scholarship (See Burley and Mattli 1993; Garrett 1995; Slaughter, Stone 
Sweet, and Weiler 1998; Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro 2005; Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 
2006; Jupille and Caporaso 2009).  While this assumption does have a large effect on the 
development of key concepts utilized in this study, which will be discussed in turn in the 
following sections, its primary contribution is providing an argument for why judges can have 
such a profound effect on the political sphere.  If judges are not capable of judicial lawmaking 
then the only times their decisions have widespread political implications is when policy makers 
choose to follow their judicial decisions.  If judges are capable of judicial lawmaking and it has 
an effect on the other branches of government, then changes in the judicial realm can have a 
marked impact.  Whether judges should engage in judicial lawmaking is an entirely separate 
matter which I do not engage in and is the purview of philosophies of law. 
 
What Comprises Legal Integration? 
 
I begin my research by breaking down the process of European legal integration into two 
dimensions: vertical and horizontal integration.  Vertical legal integration is a top down process 
where the establishment of a hierarchical legal order of courts and laws causes national courts to 
make more similar decisions over time as they increasingly come under the formal authority of a 
higher court.  The bulk of the European legal integration literature speaks mainly to vertical, 
formal, legal integration where the ECJ, ECtHR, and EU law have asserted themselves as a 
formal authority over the national courts of the member states and compel the integration of the 
national courts from the top down.  Vertical legal integration can compel national courts to take 
into account EU law and ECJ precedent, but it cannot control for variances in interpretation as 
national court judges utilize supranational law for domestic purposes. 
Horizontal legal integration involves national courts making more similar decisions over 
time because the national courts interact, borrow, and imitate each other informally.  The causes 
and role of horizontal legal integration are often ignored in the literature or seen as a side effect 
of vertical integration.  There have been hints in the European integration literature about 
horizontal legal integration in many vertical integration studies (See Jupille and Caporaso 2009; 
Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1995).  The horizontal integration process explains 
some of what others have ascribed to a vertical integration process.  My research will pursue 
further the notion that there are distinct dynamics of horizontal and informal legal integration and 
that horizontal legal integration in conjunction with vertical legal integration can contribute to a 
more complete understanding of the process of European legal integration.  The focus of my 
research is on legal convergence, it is important to note that legal differences still persist.  While 
I anticipate a continuation of convergence in the future it is not inconceivable that an unforeseen 
event or critical juncture could shift the trajectory of convergence. 
 
Achieving Shared Outcomes 
 
A common set of laws and common hierarchical veil of formal processes does not ensure 
shared legal outcomes across EU member states courts.  Consistency of legal outcomes involves 
not only a common set of laws shared, but also similarity of legal processes, institutional 
structure, and judicial interpretation.  By focusing purely on law in the process of “legal” 
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integration, European legal integration scholars have theoretically limited integration to the 
downloading of a common set of rules, rather than a process that can ensure common outcomes 
of cases across national borders within the EU.  Both Christians and Christian fundamentalist 
read the same Bible, but their interpretation of the text is radically different, just as the 
interpretation of a law may be radically different across different judiciaries in different member 
states despite the use of the same law. 
Sharing common laws entails having the same laws on the books which under the process 
of acquis communautaire has occurred readily in the EU.  Shared outcomes involves judges 
deciding case outcomes the same and with similar logics.  The distinction between sharing 
common laws and achieving shared outcomes is not a new idea.  This distinction was initially 
raised by law scholars skeptical of the influences and powers of the ECJ (Merryman 1981).  
Merryman‟s scholarship illustrates the difficulties of achieving shared outcomes and argues that 
despite the activism of the ECJ in the 1970‟s it is not yet nor is likely to ever be an institution 
capable of consistently producing shared outcomes in the member states (Merryman 1981).  
Instead, Merryman suggests that cultural changes in western civilization including the growth of 
individual rights and notions of human rights which are learned ideas largely taken for granted in 
post-WWII generations, can create a shared way of thinking which can produce shared outcomes 
(Merryman 1981).  While it is clear that judges do interpret cases and jurisprudence in 
idiosyncratic ways shared ideas, culture, experiences, and education can get judges closer to 
shared outcomes. 
In the literature focusing on “overturning” decision, there is not a single example of 
overturning by a national high court in the literature that did not also have a description about the 
differences in institutional design, process, or most commonly, interpretation by the judges in 
their empirical details.  The homogenization of law is not enough to integrate the legal realm.  
Vertical integration can compel national courts to change their laws and behavior, but it cannot 
make them homogenous in interpretation in an organic way, while horizontal integration cannot 
compel national courts to behave a certain way it can potentially lead to homogenization of 
interpretation voluntarily. 
There have been instances of national court cases in different member states where the 
cases are comparable, dealing with the same context and same EU laws, but the outcome reached 
on the cases is different due to variation in national institutions, processes, and/or interpretations.  
An example of this type of conflict occurred over interpretation of the Single European Act of 
1986 (SEA) and various European Parliament legislation on family unity and the legality of 
deporting individuals who were married to or the parent of EU citizens while not having 
citizenship themselves in three member state cases: Chahal v United Kingdom (1996), Ahmed v 
Austria (1997), and HLR v France (1998).  These three cases created mutually exclusive 
outcomes despite drawing from the same legal framework.  All three cases involve decisions to 
deport an individual who had legally immigrated to a member state and married a member state 
citizen who acquired their citizenship through birth.  The immigrant in each case was convicted 
of a non-violent crime (car theft) that was in violation of their status as non-citizens. In Chahal v 
United Kingdom (1996) the court decided that the individual had rights due to their material 
status to an EU citizen and would serve time in prison and then be allowed to stay if they desired 
to.  In Ahmed v Austria (1997) the court decided that the individual‟s rights to be united with 
their family were forfeited by the illegal action and they were deported.  HLR v France (1998) 
may be one of the most hilarious court cases, manages to cite the competing precedent of Chahal 
v United Kingdom (1996) and Ahmed v Austria (1997) and declares them both wrong deciding to 
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send the individual to prison and deport them after the sentences is served.  While this is only 
one example, it is illustrative of the limits of convergence effects of vertical integration and may 
be where horizontal integration can have its most profound impact. 
 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue 
 
Transnational judicial dialogue
1
 is composed of transnational interactions between 
national high courts judges, where judges across countries voluntarily draw upon each other‟s 
rulings, logics, and academic writings and incorporate them into their own logics and rulings.  
Transnational judicial dialogue is transnational because it involves the judges of one country 
reading the rulings and academic writings of another judge in another country.  It has become 
commonplace in many jurisdictions for judges to refer to the decisions of the courts of foreign 
jurisdictions.  It is a dialogue in the sense the judges are reading and applying the logics of 
foreign judges into their own rulings and logics and directly addressing the cases and law of 
foreign judges in their academic writings.  Transnational judicial dialogue is a mechanism by 
which courts do become more similar in their interpretations.   
I argue that the historical progression of increasingly autonomous and powerful national 
courts (court empowerment) in Europe have allowed a process of transnational judicial dialogue 
to occur.  I argue that this process of transnational judicial dialogue has furthered legal 
integration through the transmission of jurisprudence and legal concepts between different 
member state national judiciaries through informal, horizontal legal integration.  Once foreign 
law has penetrated the domestic legal realm it is influenced by domestic notions of jurisprudence 
and can interact within the domestic realm in unintended ways (Jupille and Caporaso 2009).  The 
transmission of legal concepts and shared outcomes across Europe is not solely the result of 
vertical legal integration through the ECJ.  Horizontal integration through judges choosing to 
engage in transnational judicial dialogue voluntarily has resulted in the spread of legal concepts 
across national borders and increasingly similar judicial responses to cases before national 
constitutional courts despite national differences. 
In their book Judicial Recourses in Foreign Law, Markesinis et al see judicial dialogue as 
not “envisaging the possibility that foreign law could be used as binding precedent by judges but 
rather as a source of inspiration, especially when national law is dated, unclear, or contradictory” 
(Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006, pg 5).  These authors discuss seven possibilities 
where judicial dialogue can be useful to judges (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006, pg 
109-138): 
 
1. When the court has to discover „Common principles of law‟ 
2. When local law presents a gap, ambiguity, or is in obvious need of modernization, 
and guidance would be welcome 
3. When a problem is encountered in many similar systems and it is desirable to 
have a harmonized response 
                                                 
1
 Transnational judicial dialogue stems from an older term “International Judicial Dialogue” which appears to be 
around sixteen years old and was first used by Andrew L. Strauss (Strauss 1995). I use a different term because I 
wish to refer only to the discussion that could take place between members of different national courts, not 
relationships between international courts and domestic courts.  Transnational judicial dialogue was first coined by a 
Michigan Law Professor Christopher McCrudden (McCrudden 2000). 
Littlepage, page 6 
4. When foreign experience (aided by empirically collected evidence) help disprove 
locally expressed fears about the consequences of a particular legal solution 
5. When the foreign law provides „additional‟ evidence that a proposed solution has 
„worked‟ in other systems 
6. When the statute that is interpreted comes from another legal system or has its 
origins in an international instrument 
7. When a court is confronted with a law regulating highly technical matters rather 
than value-laden issues 
 
There has been a persistent skepticism about the degree of transnational judicial dialogue, most 
of the literature on the phenomenon comes from lawyers and law professors and is part of the 
tradition of legalism, which is mainly descriptive, concerned with how it is used and the legal 
ramifications of its use.  There is also the emergence of a growing debate about its 
appropriateness and legitimacy (McCrudden 2000; Waters 2008).  Judicial dialogue has often 
been characterized as dangerous particularly by American judges and academics which is ironic 
considering the US Supreme Court is one of the most influential and regularly cited by foreign 
judiciaries (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006).  There are dangers and obstacles to the 
use of foreign law including: lack of precise information, out of date information, translation of 
law and presentation of law in a way which makes it useful to foreign judges, the impact of the 
socio-economic and political environment of the transmitting and receiving countries, legal 
certainty or cherry picking of concepts and ideas, do courts have the time and skills to deal with 
other legal systems, and the depth of analysis of foreign ideas (Markesinis, Fedtke, and 
Ackermann 2006, pg 139-172). 
The “mental disposition” of the judges has an effect on their decision to utilize foreign 
law (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006).  “Mental disposition” refers to the degree of 
open-mindedness of judges to explore and learn about foreign jurisprudence, since it is 
voluntary.  Horizontal integration flowing from informally from transnational judicial dialogue 
does not have the capacity to compel integration the way in which vertical integration can, it is a 
voluntary process.  But if judges are willing to learn about foreign jurisprudence and tackle 
common issues together through transnational judicial dialogue then they may be able to create 
an “informal network of domestic courts, interacting and engaging each other in a rich and 
complex conversation on a wide range of issues”(Waters 2008, pg 475).  The ability of foreign 
law to penetrate the domestic legal sphere through transnational judicial dialogue is at the 
discretion of the judges. 
 
A Notion of Empowerment 
 
The empowerment of courts refers to the degree of judicial autonomy and the ability to 
affect political and social change through judicial activism (Guiraudon 1998, pg 297), ability to 
act as quasi-legislators (Stone 1992), and capacity to act as full-time actors in social reform 
(Horowitz 1977; Schuck 1993).  Long terms of service for judges, capacity for judicial review, 
and protections against interference through judicial independence, all limit the capacity of 
national government to dictate procedure and penetration of law for national high courts. 
Judges do more than engage in judicial lawmaking, they settle disputes that arise from 
competing powers.  If there are multiple levels of governance, particularly if they are 
constitutionally garunteed through a system of federalism, there needs to be a party capable of 
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arbitrating the disputes between them (Shapiro 2005).  Constitutional judicial review is a 
“particularly good surveillance device” and is “useful because it often avoids head-to-head 
conflicts between member states and particularizes complaints of violation rather than 
agglomerating them into general conflicts” (Shapiro 2005, pg 373).  Most federalist style 
countries have powerful courts with constitutional judicial review such as the US, Canada, and 
Australia.  After WWII, the three losing Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) all introduced 
newly written constitutions with provisions establishing constitutional judicial review.  The EU 
operates under a system of federalism where countries are member states and the Council of 
Ministers and European Parliament are a form of “central” or “federal” government, albeit 
lacking certain powers and functions which we would normally attribute to a federal 
government.  The ECJ was established in 1952 and spent first few years demonstrating its 
usefulness as an arbitrator of member state disputes before beginning to assert itself into 
constitutional matters in 1963 (Shapiro 2005, pg 374). 
The judge as lawmaker presents a problem for democracy.  Courts are counter-
majoritarian institutions where judges are usually not elected but appointed.  Judges serve for 
long terms making accountability nearly impossible to enforce and can only be removed under 
extraordinary circumstances.  However, isolation gives judges the capacity to make unpopular 
decisions without fear of retaliation in the voting booth, allowing judges the freedom to not 
worry about being popular or being right. 
If transnational judicial dialogue is capable of any meaningful effect it is because courts 
have become an instrument of change.  Through the empowerment of national courts, 
transnational judicial dialogue became possible.  Before the empowerment of national courts, 
judges were capable of communicating and influencing each other across national borders; there 
were no formal impediments to communication.  However the capacity of judges to apply 
foreign legal concepts and/or influence the legal and political debate was institutionally limited 
by the lack of judicial power throughout Western Europe prior to the process of empowerment 
which gave judges the ability to engage in judicial activism and judicial review in the context of 
a constitutional court, act as quasi-legislators, and to act as full-time actors in social reform.  
Prior to the process of court empowerment, historically beginning with the rapid spread of 
constitutional courts across Europe since the first European constitutional court was created in 
Austria
2
 in 1920, many institutional constraints such as parliamentary statutes preventing the 
citing of foreign law, cases, and legal concepts were not uncommon. Until the Practice Statement 
of the House of Lords of 1966
3
, the citing of foreign law in British courts was forbidden under 
British law (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006, pg 4).  The process of court 
empowerment lessens the ability of the executive and legislature to control, influence, and 
determine the scope and powers of the national high courts. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Austria has the third oldest constitutional court in the world.  The Unites States (US) Supreme Court is the oldest 
constitutional court, becoming a constitutional court in 1803 through the case of Marbury v. Madison.  Australia has 
the second oldest constitutional court modeled after the US Supreme Court and created by the Judiciary Act of 1903.  
The Austrian Constitutional Court was the first separate constitutional court. 
3
 The logic behind removing restrictions on the citing of foreign law was removed mainly for reasons of practicality.  
Long judicial appointments that are difficult to terminate without substantial evidence of incompetence and/or 
mental degradation made the law unenforceable in practice.  It was also inconsistently used as an excuse to not 
renew judicial appointments for a second term which was seen as a more negative politicalization of the judicial 
process (Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006, pg 4-5). 
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An Empirical Case: United Kingdom 
 
This section will explore a single case, the United Kingdom.  The goal of this section to 
show an example of transnational judicial dialogue, explore the degree to which the phenomenon 
is occurring, and how it can influence and shape law.  This preliminary data tests the merits of 
further examination of the impact of transnational judicial dialogue.  The goal of this section is to 
show that transnational references are occurring and have been occurring since at least the 
1970‟s when the ECJ was still establishing its power and authority as the head of a vertical legal 
order.  The second goal is to illustrate that transnational reference‟s of foreign law could be 
having some convergence effects. 
 
Why the UK? 
 
The United Kingdom was chosen as the exploratory case for a variety of reasons.  First, 
the United Kingdom was chosen because of their common law system, where judges are 
expected to be highly well read in the logics of legal decisions for precedent and are encouraged 
by the legislative branch to socialize with each other through a series of sponsored conferences 
allowing new ideas to be passed on quickly (Jupille and Caporaso 2009; Slaughter 1997).  
Common law systems value logic and precedent, the traditions of the law, rather than the 
primacy of the written law which is more valued in civic/code law (Shapiro 2005).  The 
difficulty for transnational judicial dialogue in a common law system is that judges must be 
persuaded by the logic and relevance of the foreign law which may be easiest where precedent is 
vague or nonexistent.  Second, the United Kingdom has strongly resisted vertical integration and 
therefore may provide more leverage on distinguishing between vertical and horizontal effects.  
The United Kingdom received the only exemption from binding itself to the ECJ decisions and 
precedent in the first Acts of Accession treaty in 1972.  While this exemption can be seen as a 
throwaway clause that was instituted for political reasons, it does provide the British courts with 
an ability to resist decisions of ECJ with little consequences since they do have an easy out.  
Only recently have British courts declared themselves subject to EU laws and the authority of the 
ECJ in the case R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (1990) and the 
British parliament released itself from its exemption from the ECJ and accepted the authority of 
the ECHR in the Human Rights Act of 1998.  These fairly recent trends towards supranational 
authority allow the possibility of distinguishing between before and after behavior.  If a high 
degree of transnational judicial dialogue can be seen prior to the 1990‟s then it provides evidence 
of transnational judicial dialogue having potential horizontal effects which can be distinguished 
from the vertical effects of ECJ. 
 
Legislative Awareness: 
 
It is remarkable that in certain aspects of UK law the legislature has recently suggested 
that transnational judicial dialogue should occur, given the citing of foreign law in British courts 
was forbidden under British law until the Judiciary Act of 1966.  The UK parliamentary Human 
Rights Act of 1998 allows the judges the freedom to determine what cases are relevant and to 
regard these cases while making their decisions and writing their logics including legislative 
approval for citing foreign national courts, the ECJ, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).  The ECHR included a provision requiring domestic courts, when interpreting 
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European Convention rights, to take into consideration the jurisprudence of the ECHR and other 
relevant courts into account.  The law is vague as to what other relevant courts are; however, it is 
not a stretch to imagine the ECJ and national high courts in the member states being considered 
the „relevant‟ courts that must be taken into account.  However there was still skepticism about 
the use of foreign law in the debates on the Human Rights Act of 1998 in the UK Parliament, 
“those most in favor of the Bill resisted amendments which would have required the UK to apply 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, rather than merely have regard to them” 
(McCrudden 2000, pg 503 my emphasis).  The expansion of the ECHR beyond judges of 
Western Europe to include Central and Eastern European judges may have been an influential 
factor urging as cautious tone the legislative debate.  During the debate Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
argued that “we are now seeing a wider range of judges adjudicating such matters, a number of 
them drawn from jurisdictions 10 years ago not famous for their observance of human rights. It 
might be dangerous to tie ourselves to that…”4 
There was also a debate as to the desirability of introducing a strict notion of stare 
decisis.  A strong supporter of the Act, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said  
 
the doctrine of stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent, whereby we manage to tie 
ourselves up in knots forever bound by an earlier decision of an English court, 
does not find much favour north of the Border, finds no favor across the Channel, 
and is an indigenous growth of dubious merit
5
 
 
The result of the debate was to leave the British judiciary to decide how much weight it gave to 
decisions of the ECHR and other courts in its own judgments. Speaking for the Conservative 
Opposition, Lord Kingsland stated that “in short, as the jurisprudence of the convention is not 
binding, judges can really range over the substance of the Bill in any way they want.”6  The 
question as to what the Court will decide to take into account seems to some an obvious 
question.  Lord McCluskey stated  
 
In future no lawyer will be able to advise a client on any matter which might 
involve a public authority without studying not just the European jurisprudence of 
Germany, France, Spain….but also American case law, Canadian case law, and 
even Indian case law and Australian and New Zeeland case law
7
 
 
If this is indeed what occurs in the future it will be unsurprising as it has already begun to occur 
today.  For many years there has been a considerable growth in the frequency of foreign law 
being cited in British court cases.  Lord Markesinis notes that “in recent times some [judges in 
England] have broken from the ranks and manifested an open interest in…foreign law 
attempting, whenever possible, to make use of [it] in their judgments.”8 An example of this is the 
British case Barry v Midland Bank a case concerning equal pay for foreigners, where Judge Peter 
Gibson, Lord Justice (LJ), cited the German case Bundes-arbeitsgericht in his logic (McCrudden 
2000, pg 505). 
                                                 
4
 HL Debs, vol. 583, col. 513 (18 November 1997). 
5
 HL Debs, vol. 583, col. 513 (18 November 1997). 
6
 HL Debs, vol. 583, col. 515 (18 November 1997). 
7
 HL Debs, vol. 582, col. 1268 (3 November 1997). 
8
 HL Debs. vol. 582. col. 1262 (3 November 1997). 
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Preliminary Research 
The dataset compiled for this project looks at the frequency of citing foreign law in 
British high court cases and the origin (country) of the foreign law.  The dataset compiled 
contains 1402 legal cases from the British national high court taken from an electronic source 
called West Law.  More than 10,000 British legal cases have been recorded electronically on 
West Law ranging from 1970 to the present.  While these court cases do not represent the 
potential universe of possible court cases (I hope to in the future have court cases dating back 
before 1970) they were an easily accessible sample of court cases that could be readily quantified 
due to their electronic state.  All court cases meeting my parameters from West Law (campus 
version) were included in this quantitative accounting.  The parameters used were that the court 
cases were British national high court cases dealing with issues of citizenship, immigration, 
and/or human rights between 1970 and 2005 which produced 1402 British legal cases.  1970 is 
the start of the West Law database and became the natural starting point of my dataset, although 
in future studies I intend to go back to the 1920‟s if possible when judicial institutional change 
began in Europe with Austria‟s Supreme Court.  The dataset stops at 2005 in order to exclude the 
effects of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, which radically reorganized the structure of 
British courts and officially created the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and formally 
endowed it with the power of judicial review. 
Markesinis et al have argued that transnational judicial dialogue is most likely to occur in 
cases where national law is insufficient to produce a decisive and clear legal outcome or logic 
(Markesinis, Fedtke, and Ackermann 2006).  With this in mind I have intentionally looked at 
legal areas were the domestic law is vague and issues which would likely be differed to the 
courts due to their hot button political nature.  Issues of citizenship, immigration, and human 
rights are all legal issues that have been differed to courts given their constitutional complexity 
and hot button political nature (Elliott and Quinn 2005).  These three issue areas overlap to an 
extensive degree, making the inclusion of one without the others difficult to construct a dataset.  
Human rights is an area of constitutional laws that almost by its very definition requires judges 
look beyond borders, after all „human‟ does apply to all of us and are envisioned as rights 
common to every person regardless of national borders.  Immigration since 1973 has become a 
hot button issue everywhere in Europe and a concern of legislation in the European Parliament 
(Brubaker 1989; Butt Philip 1994; Guiraudon 1997; Favell 1998; Duvell 2007).  Immigration 
represents an area where Western Europe faces a common problem which is difficult to solve 
and there is limited experience dealing with the problem.  When dealing with immigration cases 
where there is no applicable precedent to draw upon, judges may be more willing to look to 
foreign law.  Citizenship is an area of constitutional law rooted in national constitutions and 
national traditions and may not be an area where judges are willing to look to foreign law.  
However, these three areas are intertwined in many legal cases and separating it out may prove a 
great obstacle. 
The data in Table One (below) is divided into categories based on time (1970-1979 and 
1980-1989 and 1990-2005) and location of foreign law (country or institution).  This data 
provides evidence of the degree to which transnational judicial dialogue is occurring and 
compares it over three time periods.  The number of court cases points to a frequency count of 
whether a citation of a bill or foreign court case is referred to in any part of the judgment of a 
British case (abstract, summary, logic, notes, judge‟s opinions, and references).  The first column 
of data on Table One shows foreign law citations by UK high court judges between 1970 and 
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1979.  There are 368 total British court cases from this time period in my dataset.  The second 
column of data on Table One shows foreign law citations by UK high court judges between 1980 
and 1989 and surveys 499 total British court cases.  The third column of data is from 1990-2005 
and contains 535 total British court cases.  There are two shortcomings of the West Law dataset 
that should be mentioned.  First, I cannot be completely sure that all possible British court cases 
are included in the West Law database
9
.  Second, the Knight Library provided only limited 
access to the data and it is possible that all of the data is present in West Law and that I have not 
been allowed access to it all. 
 
Interpreting the Data 
 
In a sampling of 1402 court cases before the British high courts since 1970, I have found 
a remarkable degree of transnational judicial dialogue occurring at least on the part of United 
Kingdom citing court cases from other countries including outside the West and Europe.  Table 
One shows that there are many countries‟ court cases cited in British court cases.  How often 
transnational judicial dialogue occurs and how much of an impact it has is often questioned by 
the few scholars who have ever examined the process and is largely the result of no one ever 
compiling a database on its frequency.  While my data is certainly in its infancy, it does illustrate 
that transnational judicial dialogue is occurring and at a not unsubstantial frequency.  It also 
illustrates that what foreign courts are cited changes over time, including the frequency.  This 
data can show how often a foreign judiciary is cited in a British high court case and changes in 
patterns of citing over time.  The strength of the data is that it provides evidence that judges are 
exposing themselves to foreign law and incorporating it into their legal decisions providing merit 
to the further study of transnational judicial dialogue.  The limits of this data are that while 
British judges may be citing foreign law it does not mean that all these acts are serious or 
significant.  The table does not provide information on how the foreign law was used.  Foreign 
law could have been referenced and then discarded as wrong as was the case in the deportation 
court case above, HLR v France (1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Given that immigration, citizenship, and human rights court cases make up about 15% of British high court cases 
(Elliott and Quinn 2005, pg 83), in a thirty five year period the court could have presiding over as many as 1575 
court cases.  Thus making my sample of 1402 court cases from 1970-2005 potentially 90% of cases heard in this 
time frame on these issues.  Exact number of court cases in these areas of law is unknown.  The British Parliament 
records all court cases heard each year and statistics on what issues are discussed, but does not keep records on 
precisely how many court cases were heard on what issues.  This number is a best guess given the percentage of 
court cases heard on immigration, citizenship, and human rights from the actual total number of court cases heard 
which is known.  While this data set is potentially incomplete (or potentially complete) it still provides enough 
information to begin to illuminate the degree of transnational judicial dialogue and possible effects. 
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Table One: Transnational Judicial Dialogue by Time Period in the United Kingdom 
High Court of/Bill 
Number of Court 
Cases with Foreign 
Citations 1970-1979 
Number of Court 
Cases with Foreign 
Citations 1980-1989 
Number of Court 
Cases with Foreign 
Citations 1990-2005 
ECHR 32 207 128 
ECJ 8 3 45 
Human Rights Act 
1998 
N/A 
N/A 
328 
Austria 21 26 23 
Belgium 29 34 31 
Bulgaria 0 5 9 
Canada 3 14 19 
Congo N/A N/A 7 
Cyprus 6 9 11 
Czech Republic N/A N/A 5 
Denmark 8 16 3 
Estonia 0 0 1 
Finland 7 3 2 
France 24 35 28 
Germany 31 15 17 
Greece 12 15 8 
Hungary 1 0 0 
India 1 3 14 
Ireland 22 32 46 
Italy 23 25 18 
Latvia 0 0 3 
Luxembourg 3 5 2 
Malta 5 2 1 
Netherlands 24 18 21 
Norway 10 7 6 
Poland 7 4 7 
Portugal 7 6 2 
Romania 0 0 11 
Scotland 12 13 22 
Slovakia N/A N/A 3 
South Africa 10 12 0 
Spain 12 9 5 
Switzerland 12 11 8 
Sweden 15 21 33 
US 2 11 69 
Source: West Law Legal Database, accessed between 2/16/2008 and 3/17/2008 and on 3/6/2009 and 4/19/2010. 
 
The data presented in Table One are frequency counts.  In the 1970‟s Austria‟s frequency 
count is twenty one.  This means that reference to an Austrian legal case was found in twenty 
one different British legal cases in the time period.  If the same Austrian legal case is mentioned 
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multiple times in one British legal case then that British case is only counted once.  If different 
Austrian legal cases are found within the same British legal case then the British legal case is 
only counted once.  A note of caution when interpreting the data, this method of frequency 
counting does allow the possibility that the same Austrian legal case may be used in twenty one 
different British cases creating a frequency count of twenty one.  The frequency counts are 
references to foreign legal cases not foreign laws or legal concepts, meaning if the British judges 
uses foreign jurisprudence without formally referencing it by the addition of a case identifier 
(which is my method of gathering frequencies)
10
 than it is not counted in my frequency chart.  
This means that my dataset should be under representing the use of foreign jurisprudence.  After 
a period of using a legal concept, judges may no longer cite the source because it has been 
assimilated into the British legal system or judges may not cite the sources if it politically 
untenable.  Often times the same British case will cite legal cases from many countries.  A 
British legal case may contain reference to an Austrian, German, and Dutch legal case and would 
be recorded as a frequency count of one for each of these three countries.  The actual number of 
British cases with foreign law tends to be lower the frequency counts as seen in Table Two 
because multiple countries‟ legal cases are cited in same British case. 
 
Table Two: Summary of Data by Time Period in the United Kingdom 
 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2005 
Number of British Cases Surveyed 368 499 535 
Number of British Cases with References to One or 
More Foreign Country‟s Judicial Cases 
92 212 284 
Total Frequency of References to a Foreign 
Sovereigns Judicial Cases 
294 451 435 
 
Table Two indicates that the number of British court cases containing foreign legal 
references is increasing over time ranging from 92 court cases in the 1970‟s to 284 court case in 
1990‟s and early 2000‟s.  This data supports my argument given the degree of transnational 
judicial dialogue in the 1970‟s before Britain was integrated into the vertical legal order.  The 
increasing degree of transnational judicial over time also provides evidence of the impact of 
horizontal integration and perhaps the large role it has played in the integrating of European legal 
realm.  The total frequency of references to foreign court cases is highest in 1980‟s both in terms 
of sheer numbers and as a percentage of the total court cases surveyed.  Perhaps the judges in the 
1980‟s were the most receptive to foreign law.  The data in Table Two suggests that 
transnational judicial dialogue should be having an increased effect on British law and ways in 
which British cases are decided as frequencies increase.  Depending on how much effect this 
phenomenon is having, which will be the subject of future research, this could account for 
increase legal integration through horizontal integration. 
The data in Table One indicates that who is cited changes over time.  Some country‟s 
court cases are cited more frequently over time such as Ireland or less frequently over time like 
Norway, while other countries ebb back and forth such as France.  This may be dependent on 
                                                 
10
 The case identifier is a British code that is place after every reference to a court case, whether foreign or domestic.  
As an example (FCH 1230 1998) identifies the case as HLR v France (1998).  FCH is the British code for France, 
1230 is the case number of HLR v France (1998) assigned by the French and 1998 is the year of the case making 
each case identifiable from its case identifier without the name of the case being present.  I search each court case 
for the case identifier code for each country to obtain my frequency counts. 
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relationships between these countries and the UK or legal developments over time.  Table One 
also indicates that British judges cite a wide range of cases including those outside Europe.  The 
citing of court cases from the Congo in the last time period may be in recognition of important 
legal changes in the Congo that British wish to support, a sign of diplomatic support.  Many 
countries are cited with great frequency in Table One, several instances of more than twenty 
court cases and as many as sixty nine. 
Table One also indicates that relationships with supranational courts have evolved over 
time.  The ECJ is cited infrequently until the last time period indicating that perhaps the 1990 
case R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd was more than the British 
courts declaring themselves subject to EU law, but the begin of openness to ECJ precedent as 
binding in the British court.  The ECHR was heavily cited in 1980‟s long before the Human 
Rights Act of 1998 was passed by the British Parliament, indicating the courts adherence to the 
convention occurred before political parliamentary support. 
 
UK Summary and Future Research 
 
 Thus far the empirical data can demonstrate the frequency and changes over time in the 
referencing of foreign legal cases.  While this is only a start it does indicate that transnational 
judicial dialogue is occurring at a significant rate (meaning at a rate which would affect the 
jurisprudence of British law) and increasing over time.  The data also indicates that which 
countries court cases are being cited changes over time.  The limits of the data gather are that it 
does not tell how the data is being used and how seriously British judges take foreign court 
cases.  Another limitation is that the data is only referencing foreign court case not all legal 
jurisprudence such as reference to legal terms and concepts without a citation, thus making this 
sample potentially under representative of the degree of transnational judicial dialogue. 
 Future research will attempt to combat these limitations and advance our understanding 
of transnational judicial dialogue.  Further work on this dataset should include efforts to 
determine where and how the court cases cited are used and to measure other foreign 
jurisprudence in British court cases such as legal concepts.  Archival research (judges‟ papers 
and journals) and interviews with living British judges will help to uncover what the judges were 
thinking when they utilized foreign legal material and how seriously they undertook this 
exploration and why.  Judges particularly British judges tend to be old, white men in powdered 
wigs and thus judges from the 1970‟s and before would not expect to be living presently.  Judges 
tend to be prolific writers leaving behind journals and various other documents and their clerks 
who tend to be young legal scholars may be a valuable source of cooperating evidence.  The 
British case should then be compared with similar research in other European countries to 
determine larger patterns. 
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